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Revisiting the 1938 Rules Experiment 
The Honorable Paul V. Niemeyer 
It is a genuine pleasure to be here at this graceful Law 
School. I can say that there is some intangible aspect that makes 
this place special, and I have always enjoyed coming here. 
I wish to thank the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Lecture Series Board, 
in particular Po Lutken, John Cleveland, and Zach Agee for their 
kind invitation and Po, John, as well as Ryan Starks and Devin 
Catlin, for their generous hospitality. 
*     *     * 
It is a particular honor to be delivering a lecture named in 
honor of Justice Lewis Powell. The Justice was a most 
distinguished alumnus of this University and its Law School, and 
it is fitting that the Law School provides the home for his papers. 
I was particularly pleased to have met with John Jacob, the 
especially knowledgeable Archivist of Justice Powell’s papers. 
After Justice Powell retired from the Supreme Court, he 
chose to sit periodically with the Fourth Circuit for a number of 
years and would have dinner with the judges during the week of 
our court sittings. I recall him describing in remarkable detail his 
initial hesitancy in accepting appointment to the Supreme Court 
and how Mrs. Powell (whom he fondly referred to as Jo for 
Josephine) advised him that he could not turn the President 
down. I also remember a discussion during one of these dinners 
in which one of the judges asked Justice Powell what opinion of 
the Court he most regretted. Without hesitancy, he responded: 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,1 which I took to be an expression of 
his love for the legal profession and his regard for it as a noble 
profession. You may recall that in Bates, the Court held, among 
                                                                                                     
  The Lewis F. Powell Jr. Distinguished Lecture presented March 27, 
2014, at the Washington and Lee School of Law. The Honorable Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
 1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
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other things, that the law profession’s blanket regulation of 
advertising by attorneys could not be justified under the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.2 Justice Powell dissented from 
this holding, noting, “It is clear that within undefined limits 
today’s decision will effect profound changes in the practice of 
law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession.”3 
Justice Powell was himself the epitome of graciousness. For 
example, whenever he sat with us, we always offered to let him 
preside, but he never chose to do so. He elected instead to sit in 
what I call the catbird seat—the seat to the right of the presiding 
judge. I have proudly retained Justice Powell’s several notes to 
me expressing his pleasure in sitting together. 
I also learned much from him. Most fundamentally, I noticed 
that when he came to court, he did so with a healthy disposition 
in favor of the process given the parties by the lower court, 
imposing squarely on the appellant the burden to demonstrate 
why we should not affirm. While that sounds obvious, when 
appellate judges so often spend time considering the intricacies of 
individual issues—the trees in the forest, if you will—the forest 
itself can be forgotten. 
Just as we were all proud to have known Justice Powell, I am 
proud to join Washington and Lee in honoring him here. 
*     *     * 
This afternoon, I propose to revisit the 1938 Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Those new rules employed a range of procedural 
devices and an underlying procedural philosophy that had never 
before been employed.4 It was no less than a bold experiment in 
procedure. 
Let me explain with some background. The 1938 Civil Rules 
did not simply appear as the singular and immediate creation of 
the Advisory Committee appointed by the Chief Justice in June of 
                                                                                                     
 2. See id. at 383 (holding that attorney advertising is not subject to 
blanket suppression).  
 3. Id. at 389 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 4. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Is Now the Time for Simplified Rules of Civil 
Procedure?, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 673, 675 (2013) [hereinafter Niemeyer, 
Simplified Rules] (discussing the changes made by, and the impact of, the 1938 
Rules).  
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1935 to draft such rules.5 To the contrary, the Advisory 
Committee’s work was the end of a long process that had begun 
in earnest almost a hundred years earlier.6 
Pleading in the federal courts had traditionally followed two 
disconnected tracks—one for courts of equity and one for courts at 
law.7 There was a third track for courts in admiralty,8 but that is 
a story for another day. 
With enactment of the Act of August 23, 1842,9 the Supreme 
Court was authorized to regulate the process and procedures in 
cases in equity, in admiralty, and at law.10 Acting on that 
authority, the Court adopted admiralty rules and updated an 
earlier set of equity rules.11 But it did nothing for rules in courts 
at law.12 Instead, it left the procedure for those cases to be 
controlled by the Conformity Act of 1828,13 which required the 
procedure at law to be that applied in the courts of the State 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 710 (1998) 
[hereinafter Subrin, Fishing Expeditions] (describing the process of establishing 
the 1935 Advisory Committee). 
 6. See id. at 692–701 (discussing the developments that led to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 7. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 918–20 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity] (discussing the traditional 
divisions between courts of equity and courts at law).  
 8. See id. at 929 (noting that admiralty jurisdiction was independent from 
courts at equity and courts at law). 
 9. Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842). 
 10. See id.  
[T]he Supreme Court shall have full power and authority . . . to 
prescribe, and regulate, and alter the forms of writs and other process 
to be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of the United 
States . . . and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common 
law, or in admiralty and in equity pending in the said courts . . . . 
 11. See HENRY M. HART JR. & HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 579–80 (1953) (noting that the Supreme Court 
promulgated ninety-two rules of equity and forty-seven admiralty rules in 
response to the Act of August 23, 1842).  
 12. See id. at 584 (discussing the impact of the Act of August 23, 1842 on 
actions at law, and noting that although the Court’s rule-making power was 
affirmed by the Act, “courts were reluctant to use that power”).  
 13. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278 (1828). 
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where the federal court sat and also by the more flexible 
Conformity Act of 1872,14 which permitted federal courts to follow 
current state practice.15 Of course, that state of affairs resulted in 
the use of inconsistent rules of procedure in the federal courts to 
the extent that state court procedures differed from State to 
State. As might be expected, the resulting uncertainty and 
confusion soon prompted calls for reform. 
Efforts began in the 1880s to create uniformity by conforming 
the rules for courts at law with the rules used in equity, except, of 
course, as necessary to preserve the right to jury trials at law.16 
Those efforts, however, fizzled. Again in 1911, the American Bar 
Association called for a uniform process in all federal courts17—a 
call also made a year earlier by President Taft18—but that 
initiative also fizzled. And the complaints about federal procedure 
continued, as did the discussions and the circulation of ideas 
through speeches, articles, and books.19 
Without delving into the details of the ensuing history, it 
suffices to say that Congress eventually enacted the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934,20 authorizing the Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules for courts at law and, importantly, providing 
that the Court “may at any time unite the general rules 
prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so 
                                                                                                     
 14. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872). 
 15. See Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278–81 (1828) (“[T]he 
forms of . . . process . . . in the courts of the United States, held in those states 
admitted into the Union . . . shall be the same in each of the said states . . . .”); 
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) (permitting practice 
and pleadings, except for admiralty and equity, to conform to state court 
procedure). 
 16. See Subrin, Equity, supra note 7, at 932 (describing the rationale 
behind seeking conformity for rules for courts at law and equity rules).  
 17. See id. at 944 n.202 (citing to ABA Report 50, which called for action to 
create a uniform process to avoid delays and costs). 
 18. See William Howard Taft, Second Annual Message, December 6, 1910, 
in 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7492, 7522–23 (1906–1913) 
(“One great crying need in the United States is cheapening the cost of litigation 
by simplifying judicial procedure and expediting final judgment.”). 
 19. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 692–97 (discussing 
complaints about procedure, discovery, and other litigation delays).  
 20. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).  
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as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both.”21 And 
this effort produced results. In 1935, the Supreme Court 
appointed an Advisory Committee to draft new rules under the 
authority of the Enabling Act, naming the former Attorney 
General William D. Mitchell as chair and Yale Law School Dean 
Charles E. Clark as reporter.22 
Clark was then of the view that “most lawyers were [not] 
sufficiently skilled to meet rigorous pleading requirements” of the 
time and that “elaborate pleadings were [not] a useful way to 
expose facts or narrow issues.”23 He had advocated simple, 
flexible rules that combined law and equity and afforded broader 
discovery.24 It was indeed true that the availability of discovery at 
the time was minimal, even though it was thought to be 
necessary to achieve justice. As George Ragland Jr., author of the 
then-famous 1932 book, Discovery Before Trial, had observed, 
“The lawyer who does not use discovery procedure is in the 
position of a physician who treats a serious case without first 
using the X-ray.”25 Both Clark and Ragland believed that greater 
clarity in the definition of the issues would be obtained by greater 
discovery, adopting the views of Professor Edson R. Sutherland of 
the University of Michigan, who wrote, as a foreword to Ragland’s 
book: 
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system 
of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of 
litigation followed by surprise and confusion at the trial. . . . 
All this is well recognized by the profession, and yet there is a 
wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to “fishing 
expeditions” before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo.26 
Against this background, the Advisory Committee began in 
earnest and, after circulating two drafts to the public, proposed 
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 710–12 (discussing 
the members and formation of the 1935 Advisory Committee).  
 23. Id. at 711 n.133. 
 24. See id. at 712 (noting that in various publications Clark argued for 
simpler rules that would also provide greater discretion to trial judges).  
 25. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251 (1932).  
 26. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND JR., DISCOVERY 
BEFORE TRIAL, at iii (1932). 
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what ultimately became the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.27 
*     *     * 
The new Rules were bold and dramatic. As announced in 
Rule 1, they were designed “to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every [civil] action”28 and with that 
understanding, they were well received, indeed praised, at least 
by judges and academics. Chief Judge John Parker of the Fourth 
Circuit stated, perhaps with some hyperbole, that the new Rules 
were “the best code of practice that is to be found anywhere in 
this country, or for that matter anywhere in the world.”29  
The 1938 Rules created one form of action known as a civil 
action;30 provided for simplified pleading31 and simplified pretrial 
proceedings that included a provision for a pretrial conference;32 
provided liberal discovery through the largest range of discovery 
mechanisms that had ever been authorized by a set of procedural 
rules;33 provided for joinder;34 and included a summary judgment 
procedure.35 But the basic elements of this new regime, as the 
Supreme Court has described them, were “notice pleading,” 
coupled with “broad and liberal” discovery.36 The role of pleading 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 729 (describing the 
proposal and promulgation of the 1938 Rules).  
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. (1938). 
 29. John J. Parker, Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REV. 735, 736 (1944).  
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (“There is one form of action—the civil 
action.”). 
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (1938) (providing general rules and standards for 
pleading). 
 32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938) (establishing rules for pretrial conferences 
and scheduling). 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938) (elaborating on the range of discovery 
provisions). 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18–20 (1938) (allowing joinder of claims and parties).  
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (1938) (describing summary judgment 
procedures). 
 36. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (describing 
the role of notice pleading); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) 
(describing the requirements of notice pleading and its relationship to liberal 
discovery); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (endorsing liberal 
discovery procedures).  
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was thus downplayed and the role of discovery, enhanced. Under 
the new order, the tasks of defining and shaping a case were 
moved from the shoulders of a pleading practice and placed in the 
arms of the multiple forms of discovery and a motions practice. 
Let me amplify this a bit. Before 1938, the role of pleadings 
was four-fold. Pleadings were designed (1) to give notice of the 
nature of a claim or defense; (2) to state the facts each party 
believed to exist; (3) to narrow the issues that were to be litigated; 
and (4) to provide a means for the early and speedy disposition of 
sham claims.37 The only traditional role of pleadings that 
survived in the new 1938 rules was the role of giving fair notice of 
a claim or defense.38 This minimalization of pleadings’ role can be 
best appreciated by looking at Rule 84 and the forms attached to 
the Civil Rules. Rule 84 provided that the forms attached to the 
new rules were designed to indicate “the simplicity and brevity” 
intended by the Rules.39 Thus, one sample form provided: “On 
June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in 
Boston, Massachusetts, defendant C.D. or defendant E.F., or both 
defendants C.D. and E.F. willfully or recklessly or negligently 
drove or caused to be driven a motor vehicle against plaintiff who 
was then crossing said highway.”40 With the addition of a demand 
for damages, that was it for a negligence complaint. Similarly, 
the form of complaint given for a claim for goods sold and 
delivered was even shorter: “Defendant owes plaintiff ten 
thousand dollars for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to 
defendant between June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.”41 
Evaluating candidly what was envisioned, we might conclude 
today that notice pleading hardly even gave notice. 
The 1938 Rules moved the other functions of traditional 
pleading to later pretrial procedures. Thus, getting facts was 
                                                                                                     
 37. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 88 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the historical functions of 
pleading and the importance of those functions).  
 38. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“[A]ll the Rules require is a ‘short and plain 
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”).  
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. (1938). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10 (1938). 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5 (1938). 
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committed to discovery; narrowing the issues was committed to 
pretrial motions, a pretrial conference, and summary judgment; 
and the speedy disposition of sham claims was similarly 
committed to a motions practice under Rules 12 and 56.42 
As a consequence, the 1938 Rules, for the first time, at any 
time and any where, gave a plaintiff almost unrestricted access to 
court and its process, leaving other gatekeeping roles of 
traditional pleading to be fulfilled by later procedures.43 
At the same time that pleadings were minimalized, discovery 
was significantly expanded and liberalized. Before 1938, any 
available discovery was afforded by the rules of equity or by the 
various state procedures incorporated into federal practice. 
Discovery was minimal and conducted only with the discretion of 
the court.44 And the mechanisms for discovery that did exist were 
complex and difficult to use.45 By contrast, the 1938 Rules greatly 
facilitated and broadened discovery, allowing a dazzling array of 
discovery mechanisms, including oral depositions, depositions by 
written interrogatories, depositions before an action was 
commenced, interrogatories to parties, discovery of documents 
and things, the physical and mental examination of parties by 
physicians, and requests for admissions of fact.46 The discovery 
rules also broadened the scope of discovery to cover any matter 
relevant to or material to the subject matter involved in the 
action.47 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 675 (describing the 
general impact of the 1938 Rules on traditional pleading).  
 43. See id. at 676–77 (describing the discovery-centered practice which has 
developed since the 1938 Rules). 
 44. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 698–99 (noting that 
use of discovery was strictly limited before 1938). 
 45. See id. at 698–701 (describing discovery procedures in federal courts 
prior to the 1938 rules).  
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938) (describing discovery procedures and 
policies).  
 47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), 34 (1938) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the 
court . . . the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (granting the court discretion to order inspection, 
copying or photographing of a variety of materials which contain “evidence 
material to any matter involved in the action”). 
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In addition, the 1938 Rules authorized attorneys to obtain 
blank subpoenas without leave of court, which allowed the 
attorneys to compel, without prior court authority, the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary 
evidence.48 As Paul Carrington, a former reporter to the Civil 
Rules Committee, later noted with some cynicism: “We now have 
900,000 attorneys running about with almost unrestrained 
subpoena power.”49 
Over the years, the new devices introduced in the 1938 Rules 
were enhanced. While notice pleading remained as originally 
promulgated in 1938, discovery was expanded in scope and 
facility through amendments made in 1946, 1963, 1966, and 
1970.50 The 1946 amendments expanded discovery’s scope to 
allow discovery of even inadmissible evidence, so long as it was 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.51 The 
amendments also eliminated the need to obtain leave of court for 
taking depositions.52 Eliminating court approval for document 
requests was accomplished by the 1970 amendments.53 
In the spirit of the new rules, the Supreme Court in 1947 
issued its seminal opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,54 which directed 
courts to accord discovery “a broad and liberal treatment.”55 The 
Court explained, “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing 
                                                                                                     
 48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (1938) (“The clerk shall issue a 
subpoena . . . signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it 
who shall fill it in before service.”). 
 49. Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 50. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2002, at 34 (discussing the 
history of Federal Discovery rules and elaborating on amendments to the rules).  
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1946) (“Relevant information need not be 
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
 52. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 32–34 (June 1946) (eliminating the need for a court’s 
permission to obtain depositions).  
 53. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2207, at 137 (discussing the 
1970 Amendment to Rule 34 and its impact on procedures for requesting 
documents). 
 54. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
 55. Id. at 507. 
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expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts 
underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.”56 
In sum, the 1938 Rules shifted procedural battles from the 
pleading stage of litigation to the newly created discovery stage 
and reassigned the responsibility for resolving discovery disputes 
from the court to the attorneys.57 This latter innovation was 
especially surprising in the context of America’s strong 
adversarial system.58 The Rules demanded that the warring 
parties work out these differences. Because this new structure of 
procedure had never before been created or used, it was indeed a 
bold experiment, albeit a well-intended one, to replace the highly 
restrictive and complex pretrial process that had existed prior to 
1938.59 
*     *     * 
Rule commentators applauded the new direction as a 
triumph of American law.60 Indeed, Armistead Dobie, the Dean of 
the University of Virginia School of Law, who later became a 
judge on the Fourth Circuit, characterized the new Rules as 
“revolutionary.”61 But it was received with substantial hesitation 
by those practicing under the rules. Trial lawyers, who were 
familiar with the traditional procedures, were understandably 
somewhat hostile to the new ideas. In response to this resistance, 
efforts were undertaken to educate the bar and to sell the new 
regime. District Judge Louis E. Goodman, recognizing that 
lawyers and judges considered the former practice as 
                                                                                                     
 56. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 57. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (noting that 
parties were expected to resolve differences outside of court).  
 58. See id. at 676 (commenting that modifying discovery practices is 
“enigmatic” given the adversarial context of U.S. legal practices).  
 59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the changes 
brought about by the 1938 rules).  
 60. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 1008, at 54–55 (describing the 
enthusiastic reception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 61. See Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. 
REV. 261, 275 (1939) (“If the term ‘revolutionary’ can be correctly applied to any 
part of the new rules, that part is discovery.”).  
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“sacrosanct,” sought to persuade them by packaging his message 
with the aspiration of achieving justice for the litigating parties.62 
As he explained to reluctant lawyers and judges in California: 
The adroit procedural maneuvering of the earlier days in the 
pleading stage, often invoked to deprive a litigant of his day in 
court, is now relegated to the archives. . . . Thus the complaint 
and the answer need do no more than, in colloquial manner, 
state on the part of the complaining party, “you did” and on 
the part of the answering party, “I did not.” 
*     *     * 
But pleadings no longer determine the issues to be tried. In 
effect, all they do is generally apprise the parties of the nature 
of the claim and the defense. Thus time and effort and expense 
is saved. Much of the reluctance to accept the philosophy of the 
new procedure was due to a failure on the part of many 
lawyers and some judges to distinguish between the pleading 
stage in litigation and the trial preparation stage. Information 
in the pleadings stage is widely different from information as 
to evidentiary matters necessary for proper trial preparation. 
Whereas simplification is made the keynote of pleadings, wide 
opportunity and liberality in the obtaining of information as to 
factual matters needed for the trial is made the keynote of the 
discovery rules.63 
The efforts to sell the 1938 Rules were successful, and even now 
few question their success. 
*     *     * 
My thesis today, however, intends to open up some basic 
questions about them. Despite their original benign purpose to 
secure the speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases, the 1938 
Rules, as applied in the ever-changing context of civil litigation, 
have over the years actually increased both the length of the 
litigation process and its cost.64 And, as a happy-for-some 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Louis E. Goodman, The New Spirit in Federal Court Procedure, 7 
F.R.D. 449, 449 (1947) (advocating for change to secure results based on justice, 
rather than results determined by procedure).  
 63. Id. at 450. 
 64. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (describing 
increased costs and delays due to changes brought about by the 1938 Rules).  
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byproduct, the 1938 Rules have vastly increased the income to 
trial attorneys65—those who, ironically, were originally reluctant 
to embrace the Rules. 
Let me first address some of the changing contexts. Based on 
a growing recognition that substantial sums may be awarded for 
pain and suffering and for punishment—something that was 
almost impossible in 1938—litigation has become an enticing 
lottery in which attorneys have come to participate as 
entrepreneurs.66 In that context, a jury awarding $10 million for 
pain and suffering to a severely burned plaintiff is taken to be 
appropriate—but so would another jury’s award of $1 million for 
the same level of pain and suffering.67 Similarly, an award of $5 
billion in punitive damages can be found as appropriate as would 
another jury’s award of $50 million for the same conduct.68 These 
are the tort law’s irrational aspects—by which I mean subjective 
aspects that cannot be predicted or measured by objective 
standards—and they have amplified the effects of the liberal 
procedural devices adopted in 1938.69 
Another major change in the legal landscape occurred in 
1966, with the adoption of Rule 23, the current class action rule, 
which was, at the time, intended only to codify and make efficient 
a procedural practice that had been employed in equity.70 But the 
1966 changes had unintended consequences, and beginning in the 
1980s when the rule was employed more robustly, it began to tax 
the limits of many other procedural rules and even to take on a 
quasi-legislative role. 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 676 (arguing that disputes stemming from expected self-
regulation delay lawsuits and enhance attorney compensation).  
 66. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational 
Centerpiece of our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2004) (discussing the 
financial incentives to practice in the tort system).  
 67. See id. at 1403 (discussing the arbitrary and irrational nature of pain 
and suffering awards).  
 68. See id. at 1409 (arguing that punitive damages are arbitrary and based 
on a jury’s reactions, rather than a rational basis).  
 69. See id. at 1401 (discussing the lack of rational criteria in measuring 
damages in the tort system).  
 70. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 1753 (describing the impact of 
the 1966 amendment on Rule 23).  
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Finally, technology has exacerbated procedural problems, 
especially in the area of discovery. The invention of xerography in 
1960 made documents substantially more numerous and 
discovery therefore more expensive.71 And the proliferation of 
email and electronic document storage beginning in the early 
1990s multiplied that effect exponentially, creating millions of 
documents relevant to a typical commercial case.72 When I came 
to the bar in the late 1960s, I can remember that a serious 
commercial case might have then generated several banker’s 
boxes of documents that could readily be reviewed within a 
reasonable time. The same case today, however, might generate a 
warehouse of documents and millions of emails saved on hard 
drives with programs and operating systems rendered obsolete by 
newer technologies, making the identification, recovery, and 
review of potentially relevant documents almost intolerably 
expensive. 
*     *     * 
Beginning in the 1970s, the bar and the public, as well as 
public officials, began to complain about the judicial process 
afforded in federal courts. While the complaints were indeed 
directed at delay and expense, they focused on judicial 
management, targeting only indirectly the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.73 In 1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the 
Pound Conference in order “to assess the troubled state of 
litigation.”74 In addressing discovery, the Conference concluded 
that “[w]ild fishing expeditions, since any material which might 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable, seem 
to be the norm.”75 
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And similarly, in 1977 the American Bar Association 
embarked on a major effort to persuade the Civil Rules 
Committee to make changes to restrict the broad scope of 
discovery authorized by Rule 26.76 When its efforts failed, the 
American College of Trial Lawyers proposed similar changes in 
the 1990s.77 
Around the same time, the President’s Council on 
Competitiveness issued a report claiming that the judicial system 
had become burdened with excessive costs and long delays.78 The 
report claimed that each year the United States was spending an 
“estimated $300 billion as an indirect cost of the civil justice 
system”79 and “$80 billion a year in direct . . . costs.”80 The report 
blamed discovery as the chief culprit. It claimed that “over 80% of 
the time and cost of a typical lawsuit involves pretrial 
examination of facts through discovery.”81 
In 1988, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act82 as a renewal of the long-standing goal that 
federal court systems secure the “just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”83 Congress identified as culprits 
delay, insufficient support services in the courts, spiraling costs 
caused by litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees, and unfair and 
inconsistent decisions brought on by pressures placed on judges 
who had to cope with the torrent of litigation.84 In addition to the 
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enactment of the 1988 Act, Congress enacted the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, again to reduce costs and delay in litigation.85 
Actions authorized and directed by the 1990 Act led to the modest 
1993 and 2000 amendments to the Civil Rules relating to case 
management and discovery.86 
During this period of public comment and criticism, the 
Supreme Court began to address costs and delay in civil 
procedure through its decisions. For the first time, the Court 
retreated from its earlier endorsement of broad-discovery, as 
articulated in Hickman v. Taylor.87 For example, in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,88 decided in 1975, the Court 
explicitly lamented the potential for abuse “of the liberal 
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”89 In 
Herbert v. Lando,90 decided in 1979, the Court noted that 
“mushrooming litigation costs” were in large part due to pretrial 
discovery, declaring that “[t]here have been repeated expressions 
of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices 
from this Court have joined the chorus.”91 In 1987, the Court in 
Anderson v. Creighton92 expanded qualified immunity based in 
substantial part on the disruptive effect of “broad-ranging 
discovery.”93 
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In addition to focusing on the breadth and cost of discovery, 
the Court also began to recognize the benefits of enhanced 
pleading and summary judgment procedures. In Celotex v. 
Catrett,94 the Court encouraged the broader use of the summary 
judgment process as a protection of the rights of defendants faced 
with meritless claims in a notice pleading system.95 And in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,96 the Court addressed directly how the 
pleading stage could mitigate potential abuses of discovery. As 
the Court explained: 
[I]t is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot 
be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary 
judgment stage” much less “lucid instructions to juries”; the 
threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious 
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings.97 
Indeed, the Court cited a letter I had written as Chair of the Civil 
Rules Committee to the Chair of the Standing Committee, 
reporting on a RAND Institute finding that “discovery accounts 
for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is 
actively employed.”98 A few years later, in 2009, the Court in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal99 again took another step in that same direction, 
holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”100 This heightened 
pleading requirement was new—indeed, shockingly new to 
some—and was, I suggest, nothing less than a retreat from the 
minimalism of notice pleading. 
To be sure, these responses by Congress, the Civil Rules 
Committee, and the Supreme Court have, on a small scale, 
targeted some of the problems inherent in the 1938 design. But 
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they have not questioned the larger structure. And, I submit, an 
inappropriate level of cost and delay still persists in civil 
procedure. 
It seems to me that Article III of the Constitution must be 
construed to require that the Third Branch provide citizens with 
an effective and efficient court system that resolves disputes in a 
speedy and inexpensive manner. Indeed, this harkens back to the 
Magna Carta itself, which provides: “Nulli vendemus, nulli 
negabimus, aut differmus justitiam, vel rectum [To no one will we 
sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice].”101 Is it 
acceptable that we have a civil procedure for resolving disputes 
that allows even routine commercial disputes to linger in a trial 
court for three years or more and that costs the litigants in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars? Most people and small 
businesses cannot afford to use such a procedure. In large 
measure because of this, our citizens continue to flee from courts 
for the resolution of their disputes, running to employ private 
arbitration, mediation, and private settlement courts with the 
hope of resolving their disputes in a timely and efficient manner. 
Must we not understand this flight as nothing less than the 
public’s condemnation of the court procedures that we are now 
providing? 
*     *     * 
When I was Chairman of the Civil Rules Committee, I 
appreciated the scope of these problems. And I also appreciated 
the reality that basic changes could probably not, for political 
reasons, then be accomplished. The promulgation of federal rules 
had by that time become a public, legislative process, with 
lobbyists representing various positions actively engaged in the 
process. For better or worse, long lost were the days when an 
advisory committee, holed up in a conference room, could 
accomplish its work in private, focusing only on the public good as 
it saw it. 
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But I did have extended discussions about the subject with 
Professor Edward Cooper, our Reporter, and Professor Geoffrey 
Hazard, who was leading the American Law Institute’s effort in 
designing Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure. We explored 
what features might be considered essential to civil process, what 
might be considered baggage, and what a fair and inexpensive 
process might look like. In the end, we came upon the idea of 
promulgating a set of parallel rules that would provide a 
simplified and efficient procedure for at least some cases. And I 
thought privately that if a set of parallel simplified rules were to 
work, maybe someday such rules could even replace important 
aspects of the original 1938 Rules. 
When we broached the idea of a set of parallel simplified 
rules to the entire Civil Rules Committee and to the Standing 
Committee, everyone who expressed a view welcomed the idea, as 
did the Chief Justice in private conversations. 
Professor Cooper undertook to begin the drafting process 
along the lines that we had discussed. His draft included, as its 
“central feature,” “a major transfer of pretrial communication 
away from discovery and to fact pleading and disclosure.”102 This 
central feature addressed directly the course correction 
necessary, but only for a limited class of cases. The draft proposed 
the mandatory application of the simplified rules to all small 
money-damage actions and an elective application to larger 
money-damage actions.103 It did not provide for application to 
proceedings in equity. 
The basic elements of the proposal were these: 
First, the draft would require pleadings to become more 
detailed, enabling an earlier serious look at the merits of a case. 
Under the proposal, a complaint would state “the details of the 
time, place, participants, and events involved in the claim,” and 
would have attached to it “each document the pleader may use to 
support the claim.”104 This approach, to some extent, anticipated 
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the approach that the Supreme Court later took in Twombly and 
Iqbal. The proposal also authorized the immediate disposition of 
some claims through the use of verified complaints and answers 
and a mini-summary judgment process.105 Under the proposal, 
the answer would likewise have to state the defendant’s position 
with the same detail required for the complaint, including the 
factual basis for any avoidances and affirmative defenses.106 
Second, the draft would enhance early discovery disclosures, 
which would have to be made within twenty days of the filing of 
the last pleading.107 While retaining Rule 26’s requirements in 
part, the draft would mandate a greater level of disclosure, more 
closely imitating what would amount to a basic form of discovery, 
but without the need for a request.108 Combined with the 
enhanced pleadings, this second proposal would “front-load” 
pretrial communications so as to enable earlier and less 
expensive disposition of cases. 
Third, the draft would restrict discovery, presumptively 
authorizing only three three-hour depositions, ten 
interrogatories, and only requests for documents and intangible 
things that “specifically identify” the matters requested.109 
Fourth, the draft would reduce the burden of the motions 
practice, requiring that all motions be combined and filed early in 
the proceedings—within thirty days of the last pleading—and 
providing that their filing not suspend any other time limitation 
established by the rules.110 
Fifth and finally, the draft would require that upon the filing 
of a complaint, the clerk of the district court would schedule the 
trial of the case not later than six months after the filing date, 
and that the specific trial date would be included in the summons 
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served with the complaint.111 Incidentally, this one change, as 
found by a study conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice at 
RAND, would constitute the single best practice for reducing 
costs and delay in litigation.112 
The Civil Rules Committee was never able to begin a debate 
on the project, as my tenure as Chair, which had already been 
extended once by the Chief Justice, expired. Had I been able to 
continue with the project, however, I would have introduced three 
additional ideas for consideration. 
First, I would have asked that the proposal expand the scope 
of the simplified rules’ applicability, making them available for 
all damage actions and some equity actions and mandatory for a 
larger segment of actions. 
Second, I would have directed an effort of exploring whether 
incentives could be established to encourage both plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys to elect to use the simplified rules when 
their use was not mandatory. Making the simplified rules 
mandatory or leveraging incentives would address the problems 
identified by the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke 
University, which concluded that “few lawyers would opt for a 
simplified track and . . . many would seek to opt out if initially 
assigned to it.”113 Alternatively, I might have even suggested that 
the Committee consider a proposal that a judge review all civil 
complaints as part of his authorizing process to issue, enabling 
the judge to control the application of the simplified rules to the 
case. 
Third, I would have initiated a discussion aimed at trimming 
down the scope of the summary judgment practice under Rule 56. 
That rule now allows, even encourages, expensive mini-trials 
within the pretrial phase of the larger case, and its use results in 
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disproportionately large costs and delay. Indeed, as a trial 
lawyer, I had concluded in the later years of trying cases that it 
was often more efficient and less costly (and usually strategically 
superior) to press for trial without engaging in the summary 
judgment process. District Judge Brock Hornby has agreed with 
me on this, as he wrote in a 2010 article, Summary Judgment 
Without Illusions.114 
*     *     * 
Wherever we now go—and I believe that there is currently 
some movement in the Civil Rules Committee to resurrect the 
simplified rules project—we must recognize that as matters 
currently stand, federal civil procedure is simply too time-
consuming and costly, by a large margin. While the goals of the 
1938 experiment were laudable in the context of the legal practice 
that existed when they were conceived and adopted, it is now 
time to review the experiment. And I suggest that a good starting 
point would be to begin with the simplified rules project that 
Professor Cooper and I initiated in 1999. In any event, I firmly 
believe that nothing short of a serious dialogue on reform is now 
in order to begin addressing the judiciary’s current unmet 
responsibilities under Article III. 
I should add that it surely would be naive of me to suggest 
that promulgating simplified rules would solve all of the current 
problems in civil procedure. Today’s litigation world has become 
too complex for such a hope. But, such an undertaking would 
undoubtedly refocus attention on the big picture, as was done in 
1215 at Runnymeade, and in 1938 in Washington, D.C. Who 
knows, such new attention might open the way to a completely 
new and better thinking on judicial process for the modern world. 
And maybe, the students at Washington and Lee could be the 
early facilitators. 
Thank you for this privilege of addressing you. 
                                                                                                     
 114. See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 3 GREEN 
BAG 2D 273, 287 (2010) (“[W]hen in doubt whether facts or inferences (not law) 
support summary judgment, judges should ‘just say no’ and let the case proceed 
to trial or settlement.”). 
